


















































I study the estimation of ﬁnite sequential games with perfect information. The ma-
jor challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration
whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. I show that this complication
resolves when unobserved oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path strategies are controlled for. Sep-
arately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each subgame perfect strategy pro-
ﬁle that rationalizes the observed outcome allows the use of the GHK simulator, the
most widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo experiments
demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method, and conﬁrm
that misspeciﬁcation of the decision order leads to underestimation of strategic eﬀect.
KEYWORD: Inference in discrete games, sequential games, Monte Carlo integra-
tion, GHK simulator, subgame perfection, perfect information
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11 INTRODUCTION
Sequential games are a standard tool to investigate sequential strategic interactions such
as ﬁrst-mover (dis-)advantages and strategic precommitment. The predetermined order of
moves provides players an opportunity to strategically commit their decision that is not
revertible once the decision is made. Preemptive behavior to deter a rival’s entry is a classical
textbook example. A clear sequence and strategic interactions are also observed in heavily
regulated industries, decisions among siblings, organizational decision making, judicial cases,
labor disputes, drafts in sports leagues, parlor and TV show games, and so on.
While countless theoretical studies on sequential games exist, there has been little em-
pirical work devoted to quantifying the relevance and implications of sequential interaction.
This presumably reﬂects not a lack of interest in this important topic, but rather the consid-
erable computational challenges. Existing empirical studies that consider sequential games,
whether exclusively or in addition to simultaneous games, range over the entry of ﬁrms
(Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002), Maruyama(2011)), technology
adoption (Schmidt-Dengler (2006)), the labor participation of couples (Kooreman (1994)
and Hiedeman (1998)), the retirement behavior of elderly couples (Jia (2005)), the location
choice of siblings (Konrad, Kunemund, Lommerud, and Robledo (2002)), political science
and international relations (Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2008) and Signorino and Tarar
(2006)), tax competition (Redoano (2007)), and the validity and limit of subgame perfection
in experimental economics (Andreoni and Blanchard (2006)). All of the existing literature
has so far focused on simple cases where: the number of players is very small (two in most
2cases); the game structure is very simple; a certain degree of symmetry is assumed among
players; or emphasis is not on the structural estimation of strategic eﬀect.1
In this paper, I propose a practical estimation method for discrete-choice pure-strategy
sequential games with perfect information, in which each player makes a decision in pub-
licly known exogenous decision order. The econometrician knows the decision order either
from institutional knowledge, by assumption, or from observation of data, and imposes the
sequential structure onto an econometric model to draw inferences on payoﬀ function and
the nature of strategic interaction. Table 1 shows an example of the typical data structure
for which the method proposed in this paper is intended to be used. This data set on young
adult siblings records their tertiary education decision at the age of 18. Within each family,
the decision is ﬁrst made by the ﬁrstborn sibling, followed by the secondborn and so on.
Among siblings, strategic interaction may be at work. Following an older sibling’s path
may facilitate the decision and positively aﬀect motivation and future learning, generating
strategic complementarity. At the same time, limited parental resources may create strategic
substitution eﬀects among their decisions. The sequential structure may generate ﬁrst-mover
(dis-)advantages.
In the proposed framework, I assume a payoﬀ function with random components that
follow normal distribution so that the game almost surely has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. By assuming a parametric model of payoﬀs and random components, estimation
relies on the maximum likelihood principle. Using micro data on heterogeneous players and
1An exception is Maruyama (2011), which is based on the approach outlined in this paper.
3Table 1: DATA EXAMPLE: DECISION ON TERTIARY EDUCATION AMONG SIB-
LINGS
Family ID Age Sex Parental income Tertiary education decision at 18
1 25 M High University - Law
1 22 M High University - Law
22 1 M L o w W o r k
3 26 F Middle University - Arts
3 24 F Middle University - Overseas
3 22 M Middle University - Arts
4 23 M Low University - Engineering
4 20 F Low Stay home






observed decisions of players, the econometrician aims to: make a statistical inference on
the payoﬀ function of players by utilizing the identiﬁcation power provided by the sequential
structure; examine the nature of strategic interaction; evaluate its implications for resource
allocation; and conduct counterfactual simulations.
The major challenge in estimation is the computation of high-dimensional truncated
integration whose domain is complicated by sequential strategic interaction. If the game
is a binary choice game played by two players, the dimension of random components in
a market is two after normalization and its estimation is straightforward. The likelihood
for a particular observed game outcome is analytically solved by using backward induction
and bivariate normal distribution function. As the number of players and the size of the
choice set grows, however, the dimension exceeds three and the likelihood function in gen-
eral no longer has an analytical solution, thus requiring simulation techniques that approx-
imate high-dimensional truncated integrals. For high-dimensional integration in standard
probit models, the most popular solution is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) sim-
4ulator. This importance-sampling simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal
probability density function, by decomposing the multivariate normal distribution into a
set of univariate normal distribution using Cholesky triangularization. However, sequential
strategic interaction causes interdependence of truncation thresholds, which undermines the
ground of the recursive conditioning approach.
I propose the use of the GHK simulator for each subgame perfect strategy proﬁle that ra-
tionalizes the observed equilibrium outcome. I show that the interdependence of truncation
thresholds in the integration domain stems from changes in oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path strate-
gies, which are counterfactuals and, from the econometrician’s viewpoint, are the source of
the indeterminacy of the strategy proﬁle that yields the observed game outcome. Thus,
the separate evaluation of likelihood contribution for each subgame perfect strategy proﬁle
allows us to control for unobserved oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path strategies so that the domain
of Monte Carlo integration becomes (hyper-)rectangle and the recursive conditioning of the
GHK simulator can be used.
To demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed estimation method, I
conduct Monte Carlo experiments using artiﬁcial data generated for a simple airline indus-
try entry game inspired by Berry (1992). The data consists of 3,000 city-pair markets. The
number of ﬁrms varies across markets from one to six and the error component has strong
within-market correlation. Overall, when the estimated model is correctly speciﬁed, the sim-
ulation bias inherent in the method of simulated likelihood tends to be small and the model
parameters are estimated fairly quickly and precisely with a small number of simulation
5draws such as twenty. I also conduct a number of misspeciﬁcation experiments. The size
of the bias due to misspeciﬁcation of the decision order depends on the extent to which the
econometrician imposes the correct decision order. While misspecifying the decision order
by up to 10 percent of observations does not lead to signiﬁcant bias, misspeciﬁcation of the
decision order in general leads to signiﬁcant downward bias of the estimate of strategic eﬀect.
In addition, the misspeciﬁcation also leads to bias of the coeﬃcient estimates of variables
that are correlated to the true decision order. Imposing independent univariate normal dis-
tribution for each error term allows researchers to avoid high-dimensional integration, but
the result shows that ignoring the existent covariance structure is another potential source
of signiﬁcant bias.
The structural estimation of non-cooperative discrete games has rapidly developed since
the seminal works by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).2 Recent
development has centered around the estimation of dynamic games (Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), and Su and Judd (2008)). However, the recent
development of dynamic game estimation mostly focuses on Markov perfect equilibrium in in-
ﬁnite repetition of simultaneous move games. By contrast, despite its voluminous theoretical
counterpart, the empirical analysis of sequential games has so far attracted limited atten-
tion and its existing literature is conﬁned to a simple framework or reduced-form analysis.
No study has so far investigated the estimation of a general class of asymmetric sequential
2For example, see Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2007) for incomplete information games, and
Ciliberto and Tamer, (2009), Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2008), Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) for complete
information games.
6games.3
After formally presenting the setup in the next section, I explain in Section 3 how the
GHK simulator can aid high-dimensional integration under subgame perfection. Monte
Carlo experiments are conducted in Section 4. Section 5 provides discussions and extensions.
Section 6 concludes.
2M O D E L
2.1 The Sequential Game
The model is a ﬁnite sequential game with perfect information. There are i =1 ,...,N players,
each makes a decision in publicly known exogenous order. The game can be set up so that
players take multiple turns alternately. Each player chooses an "action" ai from a ﬁnite set
of actions Ai, e.g. ("left", "right") and ("enter", "not enter").4 Deﬁne A ≡× iAi and let
a ≡ (a1,...,aN) denote a generic element of A.P l a y e r i’s payoﬀ, such as utility or proﬁt,
from action ai depends on a−i, the vector of actions taken by the other players. Thus the
payoﬀ function of player i is a map πi : A → R. The payoﬀ of player i given a is
πi (a,x,εi;θ1)=πi (a,x;θ1)+εi (ai), (1)
3This paper also builds upon the literature on sequential discrete choice models. Widely used nested logit
models and sequential multinomial models incorporate the sequence of decision making by one agent. The
method I propose here extends these models by introducing sequential decision making by multiple agents.
4In many potential empirical applications, every player faces the same choice set Ai. regardless of another
player’s decision. However, allowing the choice set to vary across decision nodes is possible by deﬁning Ai
as a union of available alternatives at each decision node.
7where vector x contains exogenous characteristics that describe players and the environment
in which the game is played and θ1 is a vector of parameters. The ﬁrst term, πi (a,x;θ1),i s
an assumed parametric function of mean payoﬀs. The second term, εi (ai) ∈ R,i sar a n d o m
preference shock with continuous parametric density function, gi (εi (ai);θ2),w h e r eθ2 is a
vector of parameters.5 Deﬁne εi ≡{ εi (ai)}ai∈Ai and ε ≡ (ε1,...,εN).B o t h x and ε are
common knowledge to the players, but the econometrician observes only x,n o tε.
All the game theoretical concepts used in this paper are textbook standard, except for
"action proﬁle", a, deﬁned above, which records decisions made on the equilibrium path and
corresponds to what the econometrician observes as a game outcome in data, whether the
game is sequential or simultaneous. An extensive form game is a perfect information game if
every information set is a singleton decision node. With perfect information, every decision
made earlier is observable for the following players. Player i’s (pure) strategy, si ∈ Si,s p e c i ﬁ e s
her decision at each decision node.6 Deﬁne S ≡× iSi and let s ≡ (s1,...,sN) ∈ S denote
a strategy proﬁle.S i n c e s uniquely determines a game outcome, deﬁne a(s):S → A and
ai (s):S → Ai.Asubgame of an extensive form game with perfect information is a subset
of the game that begins with a single decision node, contains all the decision nodes that
are successors of this node, and contains only these nodes. A subgame perfect equilibrium,
se, is a strategy proﬁle in which each player’s strategy is the best response to the strategies
of the other players in every subgame. It is a well-known fact that every ﬁnite game with
5I assume the additive separability of the random shock term following much of the existing literature,
such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In the following discussion, this assumption is not essential as long as
the identiﬁcation of parameter estimates is established.
6Incorporating mixed strategies in the present framework is computationally impractical and beyond the
scope of this paper.
8perfect information has a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (Zermelo’s theorem). In
addition, in the present setup, the game almost surely has a unique equilibrium. Denote this
subgame perfect equilibrium, se (x,ε;θ1) and its i’th component, se
i (x,ε;θ1).A nequilibrium
outcome function is also deﬁned as ae (x,ε;θ1) ≡ a(se (x,ε;θ1)),w i t hi t si’th component,
ae
i (x,ε;θ1).G i v e n(x,ε,θ1),t h eg a m ec a nb es o l v e dt oo b t a i nse by backward induction.
2.2 Data
The econometrician observes T independent realizations of the game, (Γ1,...,ΓT), e.g., T
diﬀerent markets, T diﬀerent families, or T periods of time. I index each realization of
the game by t. The structure and environment of the game may vary across t in terms of
the number and identity of players, the choice set of each player, the decision order, and
covariates x. The parametric forms of πi (at,x t,ε it;θ1) and gi (εi (ait);θ2) and parameters,
θ ≡ (θ1,θ 2), are assumed to be invariant across t to draw statistical inferences. In each t,
the econometrician observes equilibrium outcome ao
t and covariate vector xt. Equilibrium
strategy sit is not observed as it contains counterfactuals. The econometrician knows the
structure of game Γt, such as the number of players and the decision order. In the following
I drop the subscript for each game, t, when no ambiguity arises.
To utilize a probit simulator below, I assume a normal distribution for εt as
εt ∼ N (0,Ω). (2)
Covariance matrix Ω has dimension of ΠN
i=1 [the number of action alternatives for i] and is
9parameterized by θ2. For the parameterization of Ω, the usual identiﬁcation conditions of
probit models apply. In particular, the fact that payoﬀ πit is an unobserved latent construct
means that what the econometrician can infer from observed decisions concerns only the rel-
ative comparison of payoﬀs among alternatives and, consequently, two types of normalization
for ε are required. First, the random shock of an alternative is normalized to zero so that
the interpretation of εt is the relative diﬀerence in random shocks between the normalized
alternative and other alternatives. Second, the variance of ε is also not identiﬁed. Following
the convention, it is normalized to one.7 Below I abuse notation and use ε and Ω to denote
the error structure after normalization.
2.3 Estimation and the High-Dimensional Integration
The task of the econometrician is to make statistical inferences on θ based on the structure
of game Γt and the assumed parametric forms of πi (a,x,εi;θ1) and gi (εi (ai);θ2).S i n c e
the distribution of ε is speciﬁed fully parametrically, the estimation procedure relies on the
maximum likelihood principle. Game Γt is the unit for which individual likelihood is deﬁned.







t(xt,ε t;θ1)|θ2].( 3 )
7In some applications, information on the level of payoﬀs is available and aids identiﬁcation, typically
making the normalization of the variance of error terms unnecessary. For example, in the analysis of entry
decisions of health insurance plans, Maruyama (2011) uses equilibrium variable proﬁts that are recovered
from the demand estimation and the level of ﬁxed costs is identiﬁed.
10This leads to the following maximum likelihood problem:












The challenge in this maximum likelihood framework is that the probability term in the
likelihood involves high-dimensional integrals and generally does not have an analytical so-
lution. The dimension depends on the number of players and the number of alternatives each
player has.8 There are several cases where this likelihood function is easily computed. First
is the two dimensional case (Stackelberg games), which arises, for example, if the number
of players is two and the number of alternatives is two. The econometrician can then solve
the two threshold values for (ε1t,ε 2t) in accordance with the observed equilibrium outcome,
ao
t. The bivariate normal distribution function then produces an analytical solution for the
probability term. The vast majority of the existing literature on sequential games focuses on
the two player case. If the dimension of integration increases to three, an analytical solution
is generally not available, but the quadrature method enables numerical approximation. An-
other special case is when each stochastic component in εt follows an independent univariate
normal distribution. In most applications, th i si sas t r o n ga s s u m p t i o n .I ti m p l i e sn og a m e
speciﬁc error (e.g. market speciﬁc random component). It also implies a quite restrictive
substitution pattern among alternatives when the choice set is larger than the binary case.
For high-dimensional integration, the literature has developed the maximum simulated
8The dimension also depends on the number of turns each player has, if multiple decisions are assumed.
11likelihood (MSL) method, which utilizes Monte Carlo integration.9 The most straightforward
simulator for MSL is the crude frequency simulator, ﬁrst proposed by Lerman and Manski
(1981). The simulator for the current setup is given by



































where I []denotes an indicator function. The simulation procedure takes R sets of random
draws from the assumed distribution. For each random draw   ε
r
t, an equilibrium outcome
ae
t is solved by backward induction. The probability simulator is based on, out of R times
repetition of simulation draws, how many times the predicted equilibrium outcome coincides
with the observed equilibrium outcome. Although this simulator provides estimates that
are consistent with R and T, the simulated probability is a discontinuous function of the
parameters and is not bounded away from 0 and 1. The use of the indicator function makes
its variance quite large. Due to these problems, Lerman and Manski ﬁnd that their estimator
requires a very large number of simulations for satisfactory performance.10 Since a likelihood
evaluation of relatively large asymmetric extensive form games tends to be quite expensive,
the frequency simulator is practically infeasible.
9The method of simulated moments (MSM) and the method of simulated scores (MSS) are alternative
options. These may improve the ﬁnite sample property of estimators by removing the simulation bias
that results from the logarithm in the log likelihood function (Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998)), though
Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1994) does not ﬁnd such an advantage of MSM over MSL.
10Moreover, the discontinuity of the likelihood function requires an optimization method that does not
require diﬀerentiability of the optimand, such as the nonlinear simplex algorithm of Nelder and Mead (1964).
122.4 The GHK Simulator
For high-dimensional integration over a region of the multivariate normal, the most popular
simulator is the GHK simulator, due to Geweke (1992), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1994),
and Keane (1994). The GHK simulator recursively truncates the multivariate normal prob-
ability density function. Its algorithm draws recursively from truncated univariate normal
distributions, and relies on Cholesky triangularization to decompose the multivariate normal
distribution into a set of univariate normal distributions. The combination of the recursive
conditioning approach and the smooth univariate truncated variate generation algorithm
produces an unbiased and smooth importance sampling simulator. Compared to the fre-
quency simulator, it requires many fewer draws for alternatives with low probability of being
chosen and is unlikely to have boundary problems. A number of studies have conﬁrmed its
usefulness and relative accuracy, especially when considering the low computational eﬀort
required (Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud (1996), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998),
Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1994), Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993)).
The complication in using the GHK simulator for sequential games arises from the re-
cursive conditioning approach. The GHK algorithm repeats recursive simulation draws from
truncated univariate normal distributions so that the resulting random shocks,   ε
r,g e n e r a t e
equilibrium outcome ao, which is observed by the econometrician. The requirement for this
recursive conditioning is that, in the ε space, the truncation threshold for each simulation
draw is independent of other simulation draws and the truncation thresholds are orthog-
onal to each other. However, because of sequential strategic interaction, the truncation
13threshold for a draw may depend on other simulation draws. Due to this dependence of
truncation thresholds on random shocks of other players, recursive conditioning simulation
breaks down.11
3 USING THE GHK SIMULATOR
The problem of interdependent truncation thresholds arises as a result of changes in unob-
served oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path strategies. This point is best illustrated by an example entry
game that is played by two players, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2.12 Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader.
Firm 2 makes its entry decision having observed ﬁrm 1’s entry decision. Firms 1 and 2 incur
random shocks ε1 and ε2 respectively in their proﬁt functions. The rival’s entry reduces
payoﬀ. Each ﬁrm enters the market when it expects nonnegative proﬁts from entry. If not
enter, a ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt. Hence four possible market conﬁgurations exist, and given the
assumed payoﬀ functions, the realized values of ε1 and ε2 determine which market outcome
occurs (Figure 1). A ﬁrm with a larger random shock is more likely to enter the market.
H o w e v e r ,t h ee ﬀ e c t so fε1 and ε2 are not symmetric and the decisions of the two ﬁrms are
not independent of each other, due to the sequential nature of the game. The center part of
Figure 1 shows the asymmetry; when neither ε1 nor ε2 has dominant inﬂuence, only ﬁrm 1
enters.
The goal of this paper is to establish a computationally practical Monte Carlo integration
11Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick (2002) use the GHK simulator in their entry model of hospitals,
but strategic interactions are not explicitly modeled in their empirical speciﬁcation.
12This entry game is only for explanation purposes, as its likelihood function can easily be solved
analytically.
14Figure 1: TWO PLAYER STACKELBERG ENTRY GAME
method to evaluate the probability for each market outcome in the likelihood function.
Figure 2 illustrates this task by superimposing the probability density function of ε1 and ε2.
In this example, market conﬁguration (Out,In) does not allow the use of the standard GHK
simulator, because the domain of integration is not a rectangle, and thus drawing ε1 cannot
be conditional on ε2 and vice-versa.
The notion of subgame perfection solves this dependency. Indeed, this non-rectangular
shaped domain of integration stems from a behavioral change in an oﬀ-the-equilibrium path.
The strategic interaction in this sequential game is illustrated by its extensive form (Figure
3). With perfect information, ﬁrm 2 has two singleton decision nodes, and the choice set of
ﬁrm 2 consists of four strategies: "never enter", "imitate", "preempted", and "always enter".







Figure 2: INTEGRATION WITH NORMAL DENSITY FUNCTION
Figure 3 assumes "Out" for ﬁrm 1 and shows four equilibrium proﬁles. The extensive form
highlights several important facts. First, subgame perfection implies that ﬁrm 2 chooses the
best option based on its random shock, ε2, irrespective of ε1. Facing a large negative shock,
ﬁrm 2 chooses "never enter". For a large positive shock, ﬁrm 2 chooses "always enter". For
am e d i u mv a l u eo fε2, ﬁrm 2 chooses "preempted", i.e. it enters the market only if ﬁrm 1
does not. Due to the assumed negative impact of a rival’s entry, ﬁrm 2 never chooses the
"imitate" strategy. Secondly, diﬀerent strategy proﬁles may generate game outcomes that
are observationally equivalent to the econometrician. In Figure 3, strategy proﬁles (3) and
(4) both result in (Out,In). However, the two strategies of ﬁrm 2 under (3) and (4) have
diﬀerent implications for ﬁrm 1’s decision. When preemption is possible, the entry threshold









always enter preempted never enter





Figure 3: STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES IN THE EXTENSIVE FORM WHEN FIRM
1 CHOOSES "OUT"
Figure 4 incorporates these considerations into the (ε1,ε 2) space. Now the (Out,In) area is
divided into two rectangles, each representing diﬀerent strategy proﬁles, i.e. (3) "preempted"
and (4) "always enter" as named in Figure 3. The standard GHK procedure works as long
as the domain of integration is rectangular, or hyperrectangular in a general n-dimensional
space, and therefore, we can simulate the likelihood function by evaluating each subgame
perfect equilibrium separately.
To formalize the discussion so far in the general n-dimensional case, let s−i denotes the
subvector of strategy proﬁle s that excludes component i,a n dl e tsBR
i (x,εi,s −i;θ1) denotes
the function that determines the best response strategy of player i given x,εi, and s−i. Then,
the following result holds.























Firm 2: never enter preempted always enter
(Out,In)-(3)
Figure 4: DIVIDING AN OBSERVED MARKET OUTCOME INTO STRATEGY PRO-
FILES
Proof. Player i’s best response strategy is uniquely determined by s−i,x, and εi.T h u s ,
given s∗
−i and x,t h es e to fεi under which s∗
i is the best response strategy to s∗
−i does not
depend on another player’s component of ε. Therefore, the set of ε under which s∗ solves
the game as a subgame perfect equilibrium can be written as a Cartesian product of each
player’s set of εi under which s∗
i is the best response strategy to s∗
−i.
The logic underlying this proposition comes directly from the Nash equilibrium con-
cept, not speciﬁcally from subgame perfection. What is important here is its implication
in empirical sequential games. When the econometrician ignores subgame perfection and
only considers observed actions, ao,t h er e a l i z e dv a l u eo fεj may change player j’s oﬀ-the-
equilibrium-path decisions, which in turn aﬀects the set of εi under which player i chooses
ao
i on her equilibrium path. In contrast, the proposition clariﬁes that this interdependency
18across players does not occur at the level of subgame perfect strategy proﬁles.
The main virtue of the proposition is that for any observed market outcome, ao,b y
dividing the integration problem into the subgame perfect equilibria that rationalize ao,t h e
interdependency of integral intervals across players resolves and the standard GHK procedure
can be used. Speciﬁcally, to obtain   θML using Monte Carlo integration, the estimation
procedure evaluates the GHK simulator for every strategy proﬁle that rationalizes observed
outcome ao
t.L e tSo (a) ≡{ s ∈ S|a(s)=a}. Rewrite the individual likelihood in the original
maximum likelihood problem, (3), as
l(θ;x,a








The second equality holds owing to the fact that any ε leads to a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. The GHK simulator is used to evaluate Pr[s = se(x,ε;θ1)|θ2] for each s ∈
So (ao), following the standard procedure. The rest of this section sets out the procedure.
The probability that the event, s = se(x,ε;θ1), occurs can be rewritten using an integral.
Let n(ε,Ω) denote the probability density function of the multivariate normal variates, ε,




I [s = s
e(x,ε;θ1)]n(ε,Ω(θ2))dε
=









19The last equality holds from the proposition. Covariance matrix Ω(θ2) takes a parametric








   
i
I [εi ∈ Δi(x,s;θ1)]n(ε,Ω(θ2))dε.
The set Δi(x,s;θ1) represents the conditions that random shocks εi needs to satisfy for si
to be player i’s best response given s−1. The derivation of Δi(x,s;θ1) is based on ﬁnding
thresholds of εi by comparing payoﬀs across available strategies given s−1.T h e r e m a y b e
a strategy that is dominated by another strategy regardless of the value of εi.F o r s u c h a
dominated strategy si, Δi(x,si,s −i;θ1)=∅, and strategy proﬁle s that contains si occurs
with probability zero. Deﬁne S
o
(ao,θ 1) ⊂ So (ao) as the set of strategy proﬁles each element














In the following I focus on S
o
(ao,θ 1) so that Δi(x,s;θ1) is not the empty set.
Before applying the GHK simulator, I introduce Cholesky decomposition. For the sim-
plicity of explanation, I assume the choice set of every player is binary. Then, after nor-
malization, ε ∈ RN and Ω(θ2) is a N × N matrix. Allowing more than two alternatives is
straightforward under the GHK procedure. Denote the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of
20Ω(θ2) as L so that LL  =Ω ( θ2).D e n o t e η =( η1,...,ηN) an N-dimensional multivariate
standard normal vector; η ∼ N (0,I N). Hence we can write ε = Lη ∼ N (0,Ω(θ2)).Ii n t r o -
duce some notation to simplify the following presentation. For a vector of indexes (1,...,N),
the notation "<i " denotes the subvector (1,...,i − 1) and "≤ i" denotes the subvector
(1,...,i). Thus, for a vector ε, ε<i is the subvector of the ﬁrst i − 1 components, and ε−i
is the subvector excluding component i. For a matrix L, Lii is the i-th diagonal elements
of L,a n dLi,<i and Li,≤i denote vectors containing the ﬁrst i − 1 and i elements of row i,
respectively. Using this notation, εi = Li,≤iη≤i.







































where φ() is the probability density function of the univariate standard normal distribution.
The simulated likelihood with the GHK simulator is constructed as follows. For each sim-
ulation, r =( 1 ,...,R), prepare an N-dimensional vector of independent uniform (0,1) ran-
dom variables,   ur =(   ur
1,...,  ur
N).F o ru ∈ (0,1) and a non-empty set Δ ⊂ R,d e ﬁ n eaf u n c t i o n
q (u,Δ) which is a mapping that takes u into a truncated standard normal distribution which
ranges over Δ. For example, if Δ=( −∞,a],t h e nq (·) is a mapping into a standard normal
random variate that is right-hand truncated at a, i.e. q (u,(−∞,a]) = Φ−1 (Φ(a) · u),w h e r e
21Φ(a) is the standard normal distribution function. For given x,s,θ1,L,a n d  ur, recursively
deﬁne a sequence of simulated   η
r
i so as to satisfy si = sBR
i (x,εi,s −i;θ1) for i =1 ,...,N as
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Δ φ(η)dη. For example, if
Δ=( −∞,a],t h e nΨ(Δ) = Φ(a).T h e n
Q
s
1 ≡ Ψ({η1|L1,1η1 ∈ Δ1 (x,s;θ1)})
Q
s
2 (  η
r
<2) ≡ Ψ({η2|L2,1  η
r




N (  η
r
<N) ≡ Ψ({ηN|LN,<N  η
r
<N + LN,NηN ∈ ΔN (x,s;θ1)}).
Repeat this simulation R times for each element of S
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Using this simulator, the estimation procedure solves the following maximum simulated
22likelihood problem,














This maximum likelihood problem is solved using numerical derivatives. In searching   θ,e a c h
iteration should use the same simulation draws
 
  u1,...,  uR 
to minimize standard errors.
4 MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experimental Design
In this section I conduct Monte Carlo experiments and demonstrate the performance and
robustness of the estimation method presented in this paper. I pay particular attention to
potential simulation bias in the Monte Carlo integration and robustness with respect to the
decision order. The latter is especially important, as the precise decision order may not
be available in many empirical applications. Inspired by Berry (1992), I employ a simple
binary-choice entry game in the passenger airline industry, in which at most 6 heterogeneous
airline ﬁrms compete to serve diﬀerent markets.
A market, deﬁned as a city pair route that connects major U.S. cities, constitutes the unit
of observation. The six largest national carriers of diﬀering sizes (as deﬁned by the number
of existing served routes) non-cooperatively play a sequential entry game independently in
each market, based on predicted proﬁtability in the market. The number of players in each
market varies from 1 to 6. Following the early literature on static entry games, I assume
23a one-shot game and make no distinction between entry by new entrants and "entry" by
incumbent ﬁrms. The econometrician has a cross section data set in which she observes
which ﬁrms chose to enter into each market in the following year, in addition to the list of
"potential entrants". Also available are variables in the base period that explain the potential
proﬁtability from entry. These variables are either at the market level, ﬁrm level, or market-
ﬁrm level. In the base model, potential entrants are assumed to make their decisions in order
of size, possibly reﬂecting advantages of access to the regulation bureaucracy and airport
infrastructure.
Ten artiﬁcial data sets are generated using pseudo-random numbers. Each data set
consists of 3,000 market observations and around 8,300 market-ﬁrm observations on average
and contains information on the list of potential entrants, covariates, and generated random
shocks in each market. Throughout all the experiments conducted in this study, I use the
same ten data sets for better compatibility of the simulation results. The experiments I
conduct vary in three aspects. First, I investigate the eﬀects of changes in strategic eﬀect
and decision order. These changes in the data generating process alter market outcomes in
the data, i.e. the entry decision of each ﬁrm in each market, which is generated by solving the
game. Second, to check the computational performance, I examine the eﬀects of changing
the simulation framework, such as the number of simulation draws. Third, to study the
eﬀect of misspeciﬁcation, I impose restrictions on estimated models.
244.2 Model and Data Generating Process
In market t,ﬁ r m s(1,...,Nt) play the entry game. Firm i in market t chooses to enter if it
expects a non-negative proﬁt. The expected proﬁt from entry, πit,i s
πit (n)=x

itβ − δ ln(n)+εit
where xit is a vector of covariates that are speciﬁc to either market t,ﬁ r mi,o rﬁ r m - m a r k e t
pair (i,t), εit is the ﬁrm-market speciﬁc random component, and n is the number of ﬁrms
that choose to enter market t. The key parameter, δ, captures the strategic eﬀect. For
simplicity, the strategic eﬀect is assumed to depend only on the number of competitors, not
their identity. The random term εit is not observed to the econometrician but is known to
every ﬁrm, and follows a multivariate normal distribution: εt =( ε1t,...,εNt,t)
  ∼ N (0,Ωt).
The payoﬀ when a ﬁrm does not enter is normalized to 0. The econometrician desires to
learn about β,δ, and Ω based on observed entry decisions and xit.
The covariate vector contains the following variables: two market-speciﬁc continuous
variables, population (pop) and distance (dist); a ﬁrm-market speciﬁc continuous variable,
past proﬁtability in neighboring markets (pastp); a ﬁrm-market level dummy variable that
indicates the ﬁrm’s presence at both airports of the route in the previous period, city2;a n d
nroute, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable for the number of existing routes in the country (in 100’s)
that indicates the size of each ﬁrm and determines the decision order.
Data on the pool of entrants and covariates are generated using pseudo-random num-
25bers. For each of 3,000 markets, I ﬁrst generate market population, pop,t h en u m b e ro f
potential entrants, NCity1, and the number of potential entrants with a presence at two
airports, NCity2 based on trivariate normal distribution. These three variables are assumed




















. For pop, generated
normal variable values are transformed to a log-normal variable with mean 4.0 and standard
deviation 1.0. To constrain the number of players in each market between 1 and 6, the
two generated normal variables are transformed into truncated normal distributions. For
NCity1, the generated normal variable is transformed to a truncated normal variable with
mean 3.0 and standard deviation 1.5 and with the truncation points at 1.0 and 7.0. Like-
wise, for NCity2, the third generated normal variable is transformed to a truncated normal
variable with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 1.0 with truncation points at 0.0 and 7.0.
Both variables are then rounded down to integers. To guarantee NCity2 ≤ NCity1, NCity2
is replaced with the value of NCity1 where NCity2 >N C i t y 1.T h e n u m b e r s o f e x i s t i n g
routes, nroute,a r es e ta s(2.8,2.5,2.0,1.7,1.1,0.75) f o rt h es i xa i r l i n e s . I ne a c hm a r k e t ,
potential entrants are randomly chosen up to the number of NCity1 with probabilities pro-
portional to nroute. This determines the list of players in each market. Potential entrants
with a presence at both airports of the market are also randomly chosen up to the number
of NCity2 (each ﬁrm with same probability). This generates the dummy variable, city2.
The two remaining variables, dist and pastp are independently generated from the standard
normal distribution.
26The error component εit is also generated for the ten data sets and is kept ﬁxed throughout
all experiments. The covariance matrix of the error component, Ωt, is assumed to be a Nt×Nt
matrix with diagonal elements, 1.0, and oﬀ-diagonal elements, ρ2. In other words, εit consists
of two independent standard normal errors, (νit,νt),a s
εit =
 
(1 − ρ2)νit + ρνt
where ρ is a correlation among the error terms within a market and νt measures a market-
speciﬁc factor that makes entry more attractive for all ﬁrms in the market. The correlation,
ρ, is set to be 0.7, which implies νit and νt have about the same weights in the error term.
T h ec o e ﬃ c i e n t so n( c o n s t a n t ,pop,dist,pastp,city2,nroute)a r es e tt ob e( −5.0, 1.2, 0.0,
0.4, 1.5, 0.0). To highlight the misspeciﬁcation bias, the coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size, nroute,i s
set to zero so that the ﬁrm size aﬀects proﬁts not directly, only via the decision order. Once
I specify these parameter values, the value of strategic eﬀect parameter, δ, and the decision
order, I can solve the game by backward induction and obtain data on market outcome. The
default speciﬁcation is δ =2 .0 and assumes that ﬁrms make decisions in order of nroute.I
also conduct experiments with δ =1 .0 to study the eﬀect of the degree of strategic eﬀect
and experiments with randomized decision order to study the robustness of the proposed
method with respect to decision order.
Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive numbers from one of the 10 artiﬁcial data sets as an
example. Similar patterns are observed in the other data sets. The equilibrium number of
entrants presented in the tables is generated with two diﬀerent values of δ,1 . 0a n d2 . 0 .T h e
27majority of the 3,000 markets have two or three potential entrants. It is most likely that
markets end up with one entrant, with no entrant being the second likely outcome. The
higher value of δ magniﬁes the competitive eﬀect and leads to fewer entrants.
Table 2: EXAMPLE OF DATA SET: DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS BY NUMBER OF
ENTRANTS
Outcome number Number of potential entrants
of entrants 12345 6 Total
Total 556 794 846 528 215 61 3,000
(a) δ =1 .0 0 317 244 176 59 14 6 766
1 239 368 296 161 64 8 1,201
2 0 182 230 140 55 9 612
3 0 0 1 4 49 24 0 1 1 272
4 0 0 07 62 48 104
5 0000 1 8 8 34
6 00000 1 1 11
(b) δ =2 .0 0 317 244 176 59 14 6 816
1 239 442 429 250 102 15 1,477
2 0 108 187 149 66 21 531
3 0 0 54 52 20 10 136
4 0 0 01 81 24 34
5 00001 3 4
6 00000 2 2
Since the pool of potential entrants is constructed randomly but with probability propor-
tional to ﬁrm size, ﬁrm 1 appears in the data set most frequently and ﬁrm 6 least frequently.
When δ =1 .0, the early-mover advantages are smaller, so the entry propensity does not
vary much across ﬁrms, whereas, when δ =2 .0, the larger early-mover advantages reduce
the entry propensity of followers.
28Table 3: EXAMPLE OF DATA SET: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND ENTRY
PROFITABILITY BY AIRLINES
Airline ID Number of Entry frequency
observations δ =1 .0 δ =2 .0
1 2,091 1,005 48.1% 930 44.5%
2 1,931 934 48.4% 779 40.3%
3 1,589 724 45.6% 565 35.6%
4 1,379 628 45.5% 448 32.5%
5 803 361 45.0% 249 31.0%
6 442 205 46.4% 144 32.6%
Total 8,235 3,857 46.8% 3,115 37.8%
4.3 Results of the Experiments
The ﬁrst set of Monte Carlo experiments is based on the correct model speciﬁcation and
concerns about the size of potential simulation bias inherent in the method of simulated
likelihood for a small number of simulation draws. A debate exists in the literature on the
choice between the method of simulated likelihood and the method of simulated moments.
While the method of simulated likelihood may suﬀer from simulation bias given a ﬁxed
number of simulation draws, it is simple to implement, numerically stable, and potentially
eﬃcient under the correct speciﬁcation. Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1997) and McFadden
and Ruud (1994) provide evidence of the instability of the method of simulated moment
estimator. Nevertheless, the number of simulation draws that will lead to a suﬃciently
small bias is an empirical question speciﬁc to each application, and in particular depends on
the complexity of the covariance structure of error terms. Table 4 compares the estimates
of four diﬀerent simulation draw settings. The data generating process assumes δ =2 .0.
The ﬁrst experiment makes 20 independent simulation draws, while the second experiment
uses antithetic sampling to make 20 simulation draws, i.e. 10 symmetric replications of 10
29independent pseudo-random draws to make simulation draws more systematic. The results
show that, ﬁrst, even with only 20 independent simulation draws, the comparison of the
true parameter values and estimated values indicates overall accuracy given the estimated
standard errors. Second, however, the use of antithetic sampling considerably improves the
model ﬁt in terms of the average log likelihood value. Third, increasing the number of draws
to 40 and 300 shows a further improvement in the ﬁt, though the improvement is rather small.
T h i sp a t t e r ni sc o n s i s t e n t l yo b s e r v e di ns i m u l ations with diﬀerent values of parameters and
diﬀerent seeds of pseudo-random number generator. Since the covariance structure in the
present model is rather simple, the result shows accuracy even with a very small number of
simulation draws, albeit small simulation bias is observed. Though not shown here, for a
smaller value of ρ, i.e. a smaller market level random eﬀect, the number of simulation draws
required to generate the same level of accuracy is even smaller, since the distribution of each
random error is closer to the univariate standard normal distribution.
Table 4: POTENTIAL SIMULATION BIAS: δ =2 . 0
20 draws no antithetics 20 draws 40 draws 300 draws
θ DGP   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE
cons −5.0 −4.990 0.145 0.140 −4.982 0.146 0.142 −4.978 0.146 0.144 −4.977 0.147 0.145
pop 1.2 1.193 0.032 0.024 1.197 0.033 0.023 1.197 0.033 0.022 1.198 0.033 0.023
dist 0.0 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.010
pastp 0.4 0.389 0.018 0.023 0.388 0.018 0.023 0.388 0.018 0.023 0.388 0.018 0.023
city2 1.5 1.502 0.041 0.033 1.496 0.041 0.034 1.495 0.041 0.034 1.494 0.041 0.034
nroute 0.0 0.004 0.032 0.035 −0.002 0.032 0.036 −0.003 0.032 0.036 −0.004 0.032 0.036
δ 2.0 1.992 0.074 0.068 2.009 0.075 0.067 2.012 0.075 0.070 2.016 0.075 0.069
ρ 0.7 0.691 0.028 0.031 0.701 0.027 0.030 0.703 0.027 0.030 0.705 0.027 0.031
LogL −3145.26 −3141.20 −3140.96 −3140.57
Note: θ ≡ parameter, DGP ≡ data generating value,   θ ≡ average parameter estimate, ASE ≡ average asymptotic
standard error, MSE ≡ root mean square error, LogL ≡ average log likelihood value.
The next series of experiments examines the eﬀect of misspeciﬁcation by imposing re-
30strictions on the correctly speciﬁed model (Table 5). The data generating process assumes
δ =2 .0 and each estimation makes 40 simulation draws using antithetic sampling. The
ﬁrst restricted model assumes that the econometrician has no correct knowledge about the
decision order so estimates the model imposing a completely random decision order. The
lack of decision order information reduces the model ﬁt and leads to signiﬁcant bias of most
estimates. The serious underestimation of δ and ρ and the overestimation of nroute are
particularly notable. In the data generating process, early movers enjoy their advantages,
but without correct information on the decision order, these advantages are not captured as
a strategic eﬀect in δ and instead are captured in the positive coeﬃcient of nroute,w h i c h
determines the decision order but has no direct eﬀect on payoﬀ in the true data generating
process. Inability to well explain the entry decision of each ﬁrm results in higher weights on
individual random components, which leads to the underestimation of ρ. The two variables
that have no correlation with the decision order, dist and pastp, are nevertheless precisely
estimated, which is the case for all the experiments conducted below. The next restricted
model assumes the correct speciﬁcation of the decision order but imposes zero market level
random eﬀect, ρ =0 . Since this restriction removes the correlation between multivari-
ate normal variates, high-dimensional integration is no longer necessary and the estimation
procedure is signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed. This misspeciﬁcation, however, leads to considerable
reduction in the model ﬁt and signiﬁcant bias of estimates. The strategic eﬀect, δ, is under-
estimated because ignoring market random errors that generate correlation between entry
decisions of ﬁrms blurs the true harshness of strategic interaction. The last restricted model
31assumes no market error and no interaction eﬀect (δ =0and ρ =0 ). These restrictions
degenerate the model to a probit model. The model ﬁt is the worst in this table. Ignoring
early mover advantages again leads to a spurious positive estimate of the size eﬀect.
Table 5: RESTRICTED MODELS: δ = 2.0, 40 SIMULATION DRAWS
Full Model No Order Info No Market Error Probit
θ DGP   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE
cons −5.0 −4.978 0.146 0.144 −5.338 0.140 0.359 −5.167 0.128 0.217 −4.425 0.125 0.588
pop 1.2 1.197 0.033 0.022 1.070 0.031 0.132 1.060 0.026 0.142 0.623 0.021 0.577
dist 0.0 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.007
pastp 0.4 0.388 0.018 0.023 0.402 0.019 0.016 0.416 0.019 0.025 0.385 0.018 0.023
city2 1.5 1.495 0.041 0.034 1.565 0.038 0.072 1.619 0.038 0.124 1.560 0.036 0.066
nroute 0.0 −0.003 0.032 0.036 0.269 0.028 0.270 0.173 0.031 0.175 0.371 0.027 0.372
δ 2.0 2.012 0.075 0.070 1.472 0.070 0.531 1.394 0.052 0.609
ρ 0.7 0.703 0.027 0.030 0.488 0.039 0.214
LogL / BIC −3140.96 / 6350.32 −3226.62 / 6521.64 −3211.20 / 6483.21 −3598.46 / 7250.13
Note: θ ≡ parameter, DGP ≡ data generating value,   θ ≡ avg parameter estimate, ASE ≡ avg asymptotic standard
error, MSE ≡ root mean square error, LogL ≡ avg log likelihood value, BIC ≡ avg Bayesian information criterion.
Table 6 reports the results of the same comparison for δ =1 .0, which reﬂects a weaker
strategic eﬀect. Overall the results are consistent with the previous table. One notable
diﬀerence is that misspecifying and ignoring the sequential interaction leads to much less
reduction in the model ﬁt.
Table 6: RESTRICTED MODELS: δ = 1.0, 40 SIMULATION DRAWS
Full Model No Order Info No Market Error Probit
θ DGP   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE   θ ASE MSE
cons −5.0 −4.863 0.133 0.163 −5.003 0.131 0.096 −4.876 0.119 0.161 −4.739 0.126 0.288
pop 1.2 1.171 0.030 0.037 1.143 0.030 0.060 1.026 0.024 0.175 0.893 0.022 0.308
dist 0.0 0.001 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.010
pastp 0.4 0.391 0.018 0.021 0.398 0.018 0.018 0.417 0.018 0.025 0.421 0.019 0.028
city2 1.5 1.472 0.041 0.044 1.510 0.039 0.033 1.597 0.037 0.102 1.638 0.038 0.144
nroute 0.0 −0.005 0.028 0.026 0.073 0.026 0.077 0.098 0.029 0.102 0.151 0.028 0.154
δ 1.0 1.016 0.064 0.039 0.888 0.059 0.118 0.462 0.036 0.539
ρ 0.7 0.699 0.027 0.020 0.650 0.028 0.056
LogL / BIC −3368.05 / 6804.50 −3376.77 / 6821.95 −3447.04 / 6954.89 −3432.56 / 6918.33
Note: θ ≡ parameter, DGP ≡ data generating value,   θ ≡ avg parameter estimate, ASE ≡ avg asymptotic standard
error, MSE ≡ root mean square error, LogL ≡ avg log likelihood value, BIC ≡ avg Bayesian information criterion.
32The next set of experiments introduces various degrees of randomness in the decision
order. In many potential applications the econometrician may have a priori information
that reﬂects the true decision order only approximately. This limited knowledge about the
true decision order motivates this experiment. Speciﬁcally, while the estimated models still
assume that ﬁrms make decisions in order of nroute, I modify the data generating process
in such a way that the true decision order is determined by a weighted sum of nroute and
a random variable that follows a uniform distribution with the same mean and variance as
nroute. Thus, the weight of this uniform random variable captures the level of imprecision of
the decision order information used in the estimation. Table 7 reports the results for diﬀerent
degrees of randomness. The results show that when the econometrician correctly speciﬁes
more than 90 percent of the decision order, the diﬀerences between the estimated coeﬃcients
and their population values tend to be smaller than the estimated standard error. The fact
that the model ﬁt reduces with randomness in the decision order suggests the potential use of
non-nested model selection tests. Estimating and comparing models with diﬀerent decision
order assumptions allows us to examine which decision order best ﬁts the data.
5 DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
5.1 The Perfect Information Assumption
I use the perfect information assumption to guarantee a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium. The uniqueness is necessary to specify the domain of integration in the ε space for
33Table 7: EFFECT OF RANDOMNESS IN DECISION ORDER
Randomness misspeciﬁed δ (δ0 =2 .0) ρ (ρ0 =0 .7)
in sequence order (%)   δ ASE MSE   ρ ASE MSE LogL
0% 0.0% 2.012 0.075 0.070 0.703 0.027 0.030 −3140.96
10% 0.0% 2.012 0.075 0.070 0.703 0.027 0.030 −3140.96
20% 1.9% 2.006 0.075 0.065 0.699 0.028 0.028 −3141.24
30% 13.4% 1.939 0.075 0.098 0.667 0.030 0.047 −3162.22
40% 26.0% 1.876 0.076 0.140 0.640 0.032 0.069 −3188.38
50% 37.1% 1.823 0.076 0.192 0.623 0.032 0.086 −3209.99
60% 45.7% 1.786 0.077 0.220 0.608 0.033 0.097 −3228.39
70% 52.0% 1.737 0.077 0.266 0.590 0.034 0.115 −3245.10
80% 56.9% 1.701 0.077 0.304 0.571 0.036 0.133 −3264.87
90% 60.7% 1.685 0.077 0.321 0.568 0.036 0.137 −3272.85
100% 63.7% 1.682 0.077 0.323 0.570 0.036 0.135 −3275.09
Note: misspeciﬁed order indicates how many observations are assigned with diﬀerent
decision order.   δ,  ρ ≡ avg parameter estimate, ASE ≡ avg asymptotic standard error,
MSE ≡ root mean square error, LogL ≡ avg log likelihood value, 40 simulation draws
using antithetic sampling.
each strategy proﬁle that rationalizes the observed game outcome, without making a strong
(often ad hoc) assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism. Admittedly the per-
fect information assumption is strong in many applications. Even though the main point
of introducing sequentiality in empirical studies is to study implications of publicly known
decision order and publicly known decision history, results might be aﬀected by possibilities
that some players may move simultaneously, there may be some private information, and
"nature" may bring in uncertainty. Relaxing the perfect information assumption is possible
as long as the uniqueness of an equilibrium is guaranteed for any possible values of random
shocks, ε. In general the following approaches potentially help relaxing the perfect informa-
tion assumption. First, we can specify the game and payoﬀ function in such a way that a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium is guaranteed. Second, focusing on a set of equilibria
might provide uniqueness. An example is an entry game in which the identity of the entering
34ﬁrms is not uniquely determined but the number of entrants is uniquely determined (Berry
(1992)). Third, an equilibrium concept that is stronger than subgame perfection may help to
avoid the multiplicity of equilibria. For example, sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson
(1982)) may reduce the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁles when decision
nodes that are never reached exist (Litan and Pimienta (2008)). Fourth, some equilibrium
selection mechanism can be assumed. The use of the notions of Pareto and risk-dominance
may provide a reasonable option if it leads to a unique equilibrium.
5.2 Decision Order
The entry game example in the previous section assumes that each ﬁrm makes a one-shot
decision sequentially. In general, the proposed estimation framework allows players to take
multiple turns alternately. In simulating the likelihood function, all turns of player i must
be simulated at once, as the strategy of each player consists of a decision at every decision
node.
A more fundamental issue on decision order is the empirical analogue of decision order.
The proposed estimation framework utilizes a publicly known exogenous decision order. In
some applications, even if sequential interaction appears likely, such decision order may not
be available or may be endogenously determined. The above Monte Carlo experiments illus-
trate that misspecifying the true decision order may lead to signiﬁcant bias of the estimate
of strategic eﬀect. If the game is correctly speciﬁed except for decision order, we can draw
an inference about not only structural parameters but also decision order. Speciﬁcally, the
35econometrician can estimate diﬀerent models, each with a diﬀerent imposed decision or-
der, then conduct a model selection test for non-nested speciﬁcations. Advancing this idea
further, estimation of the population decision order by selecting the decision order that max-
imizes the likelihood function may be a possibility. The statistical properties of an estimated
decision order and how to deal with the discontinuity that arises from maximization over
decision orders are left for future research.13
5.3 Computation
For applications with relatively simple games such as the entry game example in this paper,
the computation burden of the proposed estimation procedure is fairly manageable. This is
due to the high performance of the GHK simulator, and also because, while solving a sequen-
tial game requires a large number of calculations, it does not require much multiplication
and division. For example, conducting all the Monte Carlo experiments shown in the tables
of this paper only requires a half day or so with a standard stand-alone desktop computer.14
However, increasing the number of players, the number of turns, or the number of alterna-
tives increases the dimension of integration, which may quickly make computation infeasible.
Although applications with many players, many alternatives, and many turns generally entail
less value in the structural estimation of sequential interaction, middle-sized games with a
13Endogenizing the order of decision is another possible extension. This class of games is called a leadership
game or a commitment game (Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)) and has attracted some theoretical applications
(e.g. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010)). These games endogenize the order by introducing a pre-play stage
that determines the order of decision. Consequently, these games are no longer perfect information games,
but as long as a unique outcome is secured, estimation may be possible as discussed in the previous subsection.
However, the empirical analogue of leadership games seems to be rather unclear.
14Most of the time is spent on the experiments with 300 simulation draws.
36complex covariance structure may considerably beneﬁt from the following computation tech-
niques that reduce computational burden. First, structures of payoﬀ function and strategic
interaction implied by assumed economic theory can be utilized to skip the unnecessary part
of the calculation in the backward induction algorithm. In the above entry game example,
the assumed negative eﬀect of a rival’s entry excludes one strategy ("imitate" in Figure 3)
from the simulation procedure. In Maruyama (2011) I exploit the non-increasing property
of the proﬁt function in the number of entering rival ﬁrms and reduce the computation time
by more than 95 percent. As a result, in the estimation of sequential games with at most 16
heterogeneous ﬁrms, the computational burden is not found to be a signiﬁcant problem.
Second, variance reduction techniques will enhance the performance of the simulator. The
Monte Carlo experiments above show the gain from antithetic sampling. Instead of using
pseudo-random numbers, systematic simulation draws by quasi-Monte Carlo sampling, such
as Halton sequences, and sampling methods based on orthogonal arrays will produce better
performance (Train (2003), Sándor and András (2004)). Lastly another potential avenue is
the use of a more eﬃcient importance-sampling algorithm to enhance the GHK simulator
(Liesenfeld and Richard (2010)).
6C O N C L U S I O N
In this paper I study the estimation of ﬁnite sequential games with perfect information and
propose a computationally practical estimation method that overcomes high-dimensional
truncated integration with complication due to sequential strategic interaction. I show that
37separate evaluation of each subgame perfect strategy proﬁle that rationalizes the observed
equilibrium outcome allows us to use the GHK simulator, the most widely used importance
sampling probit simulator, for Monte Carlo integration, by controlling for unobserved oﬀ-
the-equilibrium-path strategies. The method allows researchers to empirically study strate-
gic interactions in a large asymmetric game. Speciﬁcally, researchers can draw inferences
on strategic complementarity and perform counterfactual simulations that take sequential
strategic interactions into account. Monte Carlo experiments for a simple entry game exam-
ple demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method and the potential
bias resulting from misspeciﬁcation.
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